WRIGHT, ET AL. vs. SHUMWAY, ET ALs.

justice, liberty and right," not contained in that law, and which,
therefore, Judge Black says "are no pioper elements of a judicial
opinion upon it." Fortunately, neither the wisdom of those who
framed that law, nor of those from whom it was chiefly derived,
was so short-sighted. The necessary provisions ar to be found in
it, not implied only,.but expressed, not in its spirit 'alone, but in
its letter. Guided by these, we think it clear that the acts in.
question are unconstitutional, because they are a delegation of
legislative power; because they authorize taxation of a part of. the
State for the beiefit of the whole; because the money so.to be raised
is revenue, which can only be raised by the General Assembly, and
by bills originating, in the House of Representatives.
CECIL.
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FIWARb A. WRIGHT, ET A~i. VS, (MARLES N. SEIUAWAY, ET ALS;
IN EQuITY.
1. A mortgage given to secure a debt then due and payable may be redeemed or
foreclosed at any time.
.
2. A covenant on, the part of a, settler upon unsurveyed Jands of the United States
to purchase those lands as soon as they are surveyed and offered for sale by the
Government, and then m orgage them to a creditor for the security of a debt, is
not a contract in violation of.Sections 4 and 5 of an At of Congress, entitled VAn
Act for the relief of the purchasers of public lnds, and for the suppression of
fraudulent practices at the public sales of the land of the United States. [4 U.
S. Statutes at Large, 890.]
3. An equitable mortgage springs from an agreement that there shall be a lien.- A
covenant, by a debtor with his creditor, to purchase certain lands therein described, and to mortgage thdm to said creditor as a security for a debt, is an
equitable mortgage, and will be enforced in equity by a decree of sale of the promises, in pursuance of a prayer of a bill for that purpose.
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4. Where a settler on public lands, entitled to a pre-emption, procures a capitalist
to pay the purchase money into the land office, and allows him to take the
receiver's receipt in his own name, or makes an assignment to him of his certifi-

cates of location as his security for such payment, upon receiving back a bond
for a deed upon repaying on a certain day the said purchase money with interest,
and the annual taxes on the land; this is, in equity, a mortgage of the premises,
redeemable by the settler or his assigns, at or before the time the said money
becomes payable, according to the condition's of the bond.

The opinion of the Court was delivered bymuILLR, J.-The defendants, Charles N. Shumway, John P.
Shumway, Jabez N. Rogers and John'S. Harris, in the year 1849,
became indebted to these plaintiffs by several promissory notes, in
the sum of twelve hundred dollars. "On the fourteenth day of
December, 1850, Charles N. Shumway and John P. Shumway,
having settled upon and being in possession of the following
described unsurveyed public lands, executed and delivered to the
plaintiffs a deed or instrument under seal, by which they, for the
consideration therein expressed, of one dollir, did "sell, assign and
convey to the parties of the second part, all their right, title and
interest in those certain pieces of land, situate in the township of
Buffalo, in Marquette County, now occupied by the said Charles
and John N. Shumway, and on which are now standing the sawmill, dwellings, tavern stand and other buildings owned by the said
parties of the first part, or any of them. Said land being six hundred and forty acres, and embracing the mill-site on White River,
and place known as Wautoma. Together with all the water privileges, rights and easements and other appurtenances, and the buildings erected on the said land. The property hereby assigned being
intended to include all the claims held by or for the said parties .of
the first part on the lands now occupied by them, and yet unsurveyed and not sold by the United States, at said Wautoma, to have
and to hold the same to the said Edward and Augustus and their
heirs forever. This grant is intended as a security for the indebtedness of the said parties of the first part to the said parties of the
second part, consisting of three notes, in all about twelve hundred
dollars, besides interest. And the said parties of the first part
hereby covenant and agree to and with the said parties of the se-
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cond part, that they will purchase the said land of the United States
whenever the same shall be surveyed and exposed to sale; and will
mortgage the same, with the appurtenances, to the said partieg of
the second part, their survivors or assigns, to secure 'the indebtedness aforesaid, or such'part thereof as may then be unpaid, so soon
as the said land shall be exposed, to sale." This. deed was acknowledged by the grantors before a Notary Public, and filed with the
Town -Clerk as a chattel mortgage; and in October, 1852, it was
recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of the proper c6unty,
as a mortgage of r4al estate.
On the 16th December, 1850, the defendant, Jabez N. Rogers,
by his deed. duly executed and acknoWledged, confirmed the aforesaid deed, and conveyed to tliese plaintiffs his interest in these premises, for the purpose of securing this debt,
These lands were surveyed and offered for s.le by the Vnited
States, in June 1852. In Novoinber, 1852, John P. Shumway
proved up a pre-emption right, and ehtered one hundred and sixty
acres, which included the village of Wautoma, and assigned the
certificate of location to' John- Fitzgerald, in donsideration of the
payment by him of the purchase money at the lnd office, at the
request of said Shum.ray; and on the sqme day Fitzgerald eptered
in his own name, one other quarter section of.this land, for.Charles
N. Shumnway, of .which he clhiined a right of pre-emption. These
two quarter sectiofts wefe parcels of th lauds described in this
deed ; and they were purchased by afid in the name of Fitzgerald,
at the instance and request of the Shumways, he giving to each of
them a bond, in the penalty of five hundred: dollars, conditioned
that he, the said Fitzgerald, shall make to them respectively a deed
for a quarter section; asdescribed in the. bond, on paying to him
two hundred dollars, with interest, within two ye.ars 'thereafter, and
also paying the annual taxes.
After these two quarter sections were entered at the land office
as aforesaid, a demand was made by the plaintiffs, of. the Shumways, of a mortgage, in pursuance of the covenant in this deed,
which they refused.
The Bill was taken as confessed against John S. Harris, and
/
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.also against Jabez N. Rogers, he not claiming any interest in the
premises. The Shumways and' Fitzgerald made defence.
It was contended, on the part .of the defendants, that this deed
is a contract, in violation of sections 4 and 5 of an Act of Congress,
entitled "An Act ,ior the relief of the purchasers of public lands,
and for the suppression 6f fraudulent practices at the public sales
of the lands of the United States," [4"Statutes at Large, 390,] and
therefore void. I do not think that this is a contract prohibited by
this Act of Congress. The plaintiffs were merchants doing business
in the City of New York, and not contemplating the purchase of
this land, or of any interest therein, either at a -public sale by the
Government, or in any other manner, but merely desiring a security for their demand, accepted this deed for the purpose. 'The land
was not intended by the Shumways to lie the subject of a public
sale by the Government. At the date of -the deed they had the
peaceable and undisturbed possession, with the tacit or implied
assent of the *United States; and had erected "a saw-mill, dwellings,. a tavern-stand and other buildings, and had thereby an
inchoate right of pre-6mption. In consideration of their indebtedness, they executed and delivered this deed as a security merely,
and not as a conveyance. But even if the lan'd was to have been
purchased by the Shumways at a public sale, there is nothing in
this deed to'prv.ent competition in bidding, or to stop these plaintiffs from becoming the purchasers; but on the contrary; the covenant on the part of the Shumways to purchase the land and then
to mortgage it, might have induced competition, and required them
to bid it off at a much higher rate than the minimum price.
The defendants objected to this deed as void for want of consideration; and also, that if the debt was a consideration, it Was
then due and payable, and no time is mentioned for its payment,
or for the purchase of the land, or giving the mortgage, and therefore it is vague and uncertain. A conveyance, contract or mortgage founded on a past consideration is valid. Where the mortgage money "isdue ajid payable, or no time is mentioned in a
mortgage for its payment, a redemption or foreclosure may be
decreed at any time; and a mortgage intended to secure a-certain
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debt is valid- in equity for -that purpose, whatever form the debt
may assume. This deed is deolare&I to b for the securityi1 of the
debt therein specified, with. a covenant to purchase 'the land and to
mortgage it whenever it dhould be surveyed and offered for sale by
the Government. The time of performance of this covenant is not
specifically mentioned, but a time is sufficiently stated. The consideration expressed in this deed is sufficient to authorize the Court
to enforce a performance of its cbvenants.
Th7e defendants' counsel argued that this deed is -of no validity ,
as no title to the land was legally vested in the Shumways at the
time of its :delivery. ,This deed does not purport to be a mortgage
of the fe'; but, neverthelegs, it may be valid as a mortgage in
equity. In -equity,.whatever property personal or 'real, is capable
of an absolute sale, may be the subject of a mortgage. Therefore,
rights in remainder- and reversion, possibilities- coupled with an
interest, rents, .franchises ind choses in action, are .apable of beiig
mortgaged. 2 Story's Equity Jur., § 1021.' And cownts -of
equity support assignments of, or cqntracts pledging property oncontingent interests therein, and also things which have no present,
actual, potential existence, but rest in mere possibility. Mr. Justice Story in his opinion in Mitchell vA,. "Wnslow, 2 •Story's Rep., .

630, remarks: "It seems to me a clear result of all the authorities, that whenever the, parties, by their contract, intend to create
a positivd lien or charg., either upon real or upou personal propbrty, whether then owned by the assignor or contractor or not, or.if
personal property; whether it is then in ease or not, it attaches in
equity as a lien or charge, upon the particular - property as soon as

the assignor or contractor acquires a title thereto againpt the latterand all persons asierting a claim thereto under him, either voluntarily or with notice." If a mortgage be made of an estate to
which the mortgagor has not a good title, and then he who has
the real title, conveys to the mortgagor or his representative, with
a good title, the mortgagee will be entitled in equity to the benefit
of it, for itiwill be considered as a gift into the old stock. Seabourne vs. Parvel, 2 Vern., 10; Porter vs. -Emey, I Cha. Rep.,
97; H7ort vs. Middlehurst, 8 Atkyns, 376, Coodright vs. Meade,
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.3 Burrows, 1703; McGinnis vs. Noble, 7 Watts & Serg., 454;
Lessee of Harmer'sHeirs vs. Morris and Gwynne, 1 McLean, 44;
S, C., 7 Peters, 544.
This deed purports to be a iortgage by the Shumways, of all
their property or interest then existing, whatever it might be, with
an express covenant to purchase. the land of ihe United States,
whenever it shall be surveyed and exposed to sale; and then to
mortgage it to these plaintiffs, to secure their indebtedness. -By
an express written agreement to make a mortgage, a lien is created
on the land in equity, on the principle that what has been agreed
to be performed, shall be performed. Hankey vs. Vernon, 2 Cox.
12; 8 Powell on Mort. 1047, a. b. An equitable mortgage springs
from an agreement express or implied, that there shall be a lien.
The agreement in this case, to purchase the land therein described,
and then t 9 mortgage it, is express, and is a specific lien which will
be enforced in equity. Finch vs. The Earl of Winchelsea, 1 Peer
Williams, 277 ; Premault vs. Iedire, ib. 249 ; Deacon vs. Smith,
8 Atkyns, 823 ; Tooke vs. Hastings, 2 Vern. 97 ; Lyde vs. Hynn,
4 Sim. 505; Laundell and Wife vs. Breary, ib. 481; Mitchell
vs. T e Archbishop of York, 6 Sim. 224; Burn vs. Burn, 3
Vesey, jr., 581; Legoide vs. Hodges, 1 id. 477. The same principle- seems also to be well established in the Courts of this
country. In the. matter of Howe and Wife, 1 Paige Rep. 131 ;
Delaire vs. Keenan,' 3 Desauss, 74; Ienude vs. Delaire, 2 id.
564; Dow vs. Ken, Spears, 413; Campbell vs. Hosely, 6 Litt.
858 ; Pleming vs. Harrison,2 Bibb. 171 ; _ichter vs. Selin, 8 S,
& R. 425; Tyson vs. Passmore, 2 Barr. Pa. Rep. 122; Nicholas
vs. Longworth, 1 McLean, 895. I do not deem it necessary to
enter upon a minute statement of these authorities, and many
others, as I consider the principle to be settled beyond all controversy. This deed is then an equitable mortgage, to be enforced by
bill, in equity.
The legal title to this land is in Fitzgerald, subject to the equity
of the Shum*ays, to redeem, on or before the days of payment
specified in the bonds of Fitzgerald, to them, for conveyance. On
or before the days of payment, as specified in said bond, Fitz-

26

WRIGHT,

MT AL.

VS. SHUMWAY,

FT ALS.

gerald is obligated to convey to the Shumways, or to their assigns,
or to the purchasers,'under a decree in this case, upon the payment to him of the amount he advanced for the land, .to ,the
government, with interest according to the Conditions of the bond.
When the land was -purchased of the government, the Shumways
were in the, possession thereof, holding the same against the world,
with the tacit or implied assenx of the United States ; and they so
continue until thib day. The bonds of Fitzgerald, for deeds are
not conveyances of the land, neither are .they leases; but they. are
obligations whereby the Shumways, or their Tepresentatives or
assigns, maycompel, by bills in equity, conveyances of the fee)
upon.the piyment of the -.purchase money according to their conditions. The purchase of the land by Fitzgerald, at the instance
and request of. .the Shumways, the settlers and iinprovers. in
possession) axid their aceptance of bonds for conveyances, is the
same in equity as if they. haq made the purchase in their own
names, with money borrowed of Fitzgerald, and secured by mortgages of the land. "
It is not 4ecessary to determine the question of priority of lien,
as the plaintiffs consent -to a decree of sale of the two quarter
sections entered by Fitzgerald svbject to his lien, according to the
conditions of his bonds to the Shumways, the premises being- con,sidered quite valuable and abundant for the payment of both liens.
A decdee of sale according to the prayer of the bill is proper.
The plaintiffs might have come into Court with a billpraying
specific performance of the contract to mortgage, but such a useless proceeding is-not required. The deed under eonsiderktion, is
an equitable mortgage of the premises, and is considered, in this
Court, as to these parties, the same as a mortgage executed and
delivered in legal form.

SHARPLESS vs. THE MAYOR, &c., OF PHILADELPHIA.

Supreme Court*of Pennsylvania at Pittsburg, September, 1853.
SHARPLESS, ET AL VS. THE MAYOR, &C.*)OF PHIA.DEIALPIA.

1

1st. In-determining whether an act of the Legislature is constitutional,
we must look to the body of the constitution itself for the reasons. The
general principles of justice, liberty and right, not contained nor expressed
in that
are no proper elements to base a judicial decision upon.
2d. Ifinstrument,
such an act
be a written general grant of legislative power; that
is, if being a law, and if it be not forbidden expressly or impliedly, either
by the State or Federal Constitution, it is valid.
3d. To make it void, iA must be clearly not an exercise of legislative
authority, or else be forbidden so plainly as to leave the case free from all
doubt.
4th. An act of Assembly authorizing subscriptions by a city to the
stock of a railroad corporation, is not forbidden in article first, section
thirteenth of the, State Constitution; that section not being a restriction
upon the legislative authority of the two Houses, but a bestowal of privilege upon the separate branches.
5th. Such act does not impair the'obligation of any existing contfacts,
nor does it attempt an impossibility by creating a contract; but merely
authorizes the corporations to make one, if they shall see proper.
6th. This is not; such an injury to plaintiffs lands, goods, or person,
that they are entitled to judicial remedy for it, agreeably to section eleven,
article nine. It, is no injury at all,.except on the gratuitous assumption
that it is forbidden in some other part of the constitution.:
7th. It does not violate the right of acquiring, possessing,'or protecting
property secured by section first, article nine. The right of property iq
not so absolute but that it may be taxed for public benefit.
8th. This is not- a taking of private property for public use without
compensation, contrary to section tenth, article nine. When property is
not seized and directly appropriated to public use, though subjected in the
hands of the owner to greater burdens than before it is not taken.
9th. It cannot be said that the plaintiffs will be deprived of their property in violation of section eleventh, article nine. The settled meaning
of the word "deprive," as there used, is the same as that of 1 taken" in
section ten.
10th. An act of Assembly to authorize the taking of private property

I The within points stated by Ch. J. Black, form an abstract of the

opinion of the

Court. This being the majority opinion, has already been widely distributed by the
newspapers, and will appear in due season in IFarris' Reports.

For these reasons,

as well as by reason of its very great length, we have not given it to our readers.
The minority opinions cannot appear in the regular volume of reports, and we shall
therefore admit them to our 'pages. We give in this number the dissenting opinion

of Mr. Justice Lowrie, and shall give in our next the opinion of Mr. Justice Lewis.
E.,s. Am. L. R.
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for private use would be unconstitutional, because it would not be legislation, but a mere deeree between private
,parties; but this is no taking in
any uses.

for
any sense, for any purposes or
11th. Plaintiffs have no'ground for complaint against the Acts of Assem.
bly now in question because they authorize the creation of a public debt,
of which they may be required hereafter to pay a part in the shape of
taxes, for by-taxation alone can any harm ever come to them.
12th. If it be withi 1 the scope of our legislative powers, with.consent
of the local authorities, to permit assessments of local .taxes, for the purpose
of assisting the corporation to build railroads, bearing to tax payers the
relation which these roads do, then the laws complained of- are unobjectionable.
.
13th. Taxation is a legislative right and duty which must be exercised
by the General Assembly through the medium of laws pasied by them
under their authority . ....
14th. The power of the Assembly with reference to taxation is liiited
by their own discretion. For its abuse, members are accountable to nobody
but their own constituents.
. 15th. By taxation*is meant a certain. mode of raising rdvenue, for piublic
purposes, in which the -community. that pays it have an interest. The
right of the State to lay taxes has no greater extent than this.
' 16th. The'act of ajegislature authoriing ontributions to be levied for
a mere private purpose, or for-a purpose which, although public, is one in
which the people, from whom they are exacte4, have no interest would
not be law, but a senten'ce commanding a judicial payment of. a certain
sum by one portion or class of people to another-the, power to make such
a law is not legislative hut judicial, and was not given to the Assembly by
the general grant of legislative authority.
- .
17th. But to make a tax law*unconstitutional, when thus'granted, it
must be apparent that the community taxed can hav6 no possible interest
in the purpose to which their money is to be applied. This is more especially true if it be a local tax. Local authorities have themselves levied
taxes in pursuance of an act of Assembly. 18th. If, therefore, making a railroac.be a mere privat affair, or if. tho
people of -Philadelphia ,have manifestly no interest in the- .railroads which
run to and towards-the aity from Easton, and from Wheeling, then the
laws are unconstitutional.
19th. But if railroads 're' not private affairs, are but public improvements, then it is the right and duty of the State to advance commerce and
promote the welfare of the people, by making them, or causing them to be
made, at the public expense.
20th. If the State declines to make .desirable or public improvements
she may permit it to be done by companies. , The fact thaf it is made by
a private corporation does not take away its character as a public work.
21st. The right of the company by which ii is made to be compensated
fur the expense of constructing it, by taking tolls for its use, though it
'gives the corporation an interest in it, it does n6t extinguish the interest
of the-public, nor make the work private, because, to say nothing of other
advantages, though the public may pay toll, still -they can travel on it
much cheaper than without it.
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22d. The State may, therefore, rightfully aid in the execution of such
-public works by delegating to corporations the right of eminent domain,
as she always does, or by the execution of the taxing power, as she does
very often.
23d. The right of local authorities to tax a particiflar city for local improvement is as clear a right as to lay a general tax for any public purpose
whatsoever.
24th. If the State having constitutional power can create a State debt
by a subscription in behalf of the whole people to the stock of private corporations engaged in making public works, it follows from what has been
before said that she may authorize a city or district to do the same thing,
provided such city or district has a special interest in the work to be so
aided.
25th. There is not a case in which we can determine as matter of law
that the city has no interest in the proposed railroads.' That this is true
as matter of fact has, not even been asserted in argument; only a little
more than intimated.
26th. If the Legislature and the Councils decide that th6 city has an
interest large enough to justify these subscriptions, we cannot gainsay this
without declaring all interest to be flatly'impossible, and to do that would
be absurd.
27th. Finally, if the, authorities of the city, in accordance with their
charter, and with certain laws supplementary thereto, -are about to create
a public debt for public purposes, in which the city has an interest, it will
be as valid and binding as if it had been legally contracted to accomplish
any other public purpose for the benefit of the city. Opinion per BLACK,
Oh. J. WooDwARD & KNoX, J.J. assenting, LEwIs & Lownin.; J. J.
dissenting.
The following dissenting opinion -was delivered by
is insisted that a municipal corporation, even
LowRIE, J.-It
with the consent of the Legislature and of a majority of its voters,
has no constitutional right to become a stockholder in a- rail-road
corporation, and may not borrow money to enable it to do so. The
measure derives no essential virtue from the vote of the people of
the town or city, or from the will of their officers; for the citizen
claims the more authoritative protection of the State. He owes no
allegiance to towns or cities, or to local majorities of any kind, but
only to the State; which alone is sovereign; and it is this allegiance
alone that enforces his obedience to local authorities. Towns and
cities may command and act where the Legislature can give them
authority to do so, and has given it; and without this, neither town
officers nor town majorities, even though unanimous, have any legitimate control over the property or rights of the citizen. All the
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efficacy of the subscription is therefore dependent upon the act. of
the Legislature, and-if under the constitution, such an act is excluded from the province of government, then of course, no legislative
sanction and no combination of governtnental mijorities can mhke
it valid.
"
The jirinciple involved in this case-has beet%so often acted on by
the Legislatures'of our own arid of other States, and its correctness
has been so often qffirmed by judges, -rhose learning and talents I
may emulate, but caniot hope to equal; that it'is with the utmost
diffidence that I venture to express a contrary opinion.
When.a proposed measure promiges a-presbnt- advantage, and
there is no alparent wron'g to any one incarrying it out; 'it is no.t
unusual to enter upon it without scrutiiihg with aniy suspicious
care, the tendency f the .principle on which it.
is. basd, and even
witlout studying'#hat the principle of it is. The extuple _being.
once set, is-followed by many sifailar Istances; and it is-not'umtil
the practice begins to run to azi extreme;- and to .devdlopits dangerous results,- that we begin to sdspect its fundamental principle,
or .to doubt the propriety of thd action of 4 iose yvho-le4 the wa.-.
This thought may furnish some apology for the boldness that.-luestions the first impressions of Legislatuie and of Courts; and it-is
not without considerable. illustration in the laws,..rguments anhd
decisions on this very subject. -Itwould .be 'surprising, *if the first
attempts .to define -.the application.of a priciplecshould be entirely
successful. And even if they were, they could- not be.known to.be
correct, until they had.stood the test of many subsequent disputes.
Like a boundary'llne through a wilderness cou)try--it may require
many experimental surveys,-- conditional lints' -temporary cqnces-.
sions and earnest contests, before its true place can'be. defined and
settled.'.
-.
In -the case of the Commonwealth vs. -MeWilliams, 11 State, R.
70, this Court. seem8 .ohave affirmed. the constititionality of such
an act as this we are now considering; be-cause no unconstitutional
principle was pointed out by. the Counsel or seen by. the. Court, as
being involved, in'the measure.

The only positive principle, enun-

ciated by the Court, in support of the measure, is that the Legisla-
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ture may authorize local taxation for local improvements. Without
-that principle, (not needed by the case) that act of Assembly could
not have been sustained, and I shall endeavor to show that, even
with it, it could not be.
Several other cases in other States carry the principle of local
taxation even farther. aodden vs. Cr'ump, 8 Leigh, 120; Harrison vs. ffollandi 3 Grattan, 347 ; T homas vs. Leland, 24 Wend.
65; Shaw vs. -Dennis, 5 Gilman, 405; Beple vs. Brooklyn, 4

Comstock, 419. But none of these cases are in point as to the
means by which the measure is proposed to be effectuated here;
and in my opinion, they do not involve the essential principle of
the present causes.
It is otherwise, however, in the cases of Bridgeportvs. Hfousatonic B. R. Co., 15 Conn. 475; Nichol vs. Nashville, 9 Hump.
252; Talbot *vs. Dent, 9 B. Monroe, 526; and Cincinnati, TV.&
Z. B. B. Co.' vs. Clinton Co., lately decided by the Supreme
Court of.Ohio.
I take the last case as a fair sample of them all,--The aim of the
learned Court, so far as it is important to notice it here, is to show
that the work was of such a local character as to justify local taxation by the Legislature, either directly or through the'local authorities, and having done so, (as is supposed,) the inference is drawn"if" "either might do the whole (work) is it not too obvious for
doubt," "as a question of power, that each may be authorized to
do a part?" Certainly it is. But I .most respectfully think that
this does not exhaust the argument. Nor do I presume that the
learned Court regarded it as so doing; for, in another place, they
say that the object being proper, it "might be done by any means,
not prohibited, adapted to the end in view, and subscription of
stock to a company incorporated for that purpose is not objectionable." Here is the very question of the cause; and without admitting the correctness of the views expressed as to the absoluteness
of the legislature's power of local taxation for improvements which
they may call local, I cannot help thinking that this question of
the means has not been fully considered. Are not the means prohibited by the Constitution ?
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When we notice the character of municipal corporations, it seems
somewhat strange that they should be allowed to borrow money for
any purpose, except as a mere temporary expedient. Our municipal corporations have none of the sacredness that belonged to the
chartered municipalties of England. Theirs were grants of franchises and privileges, generally purchased and paid for, and guarantied by Magna Charta, and were part of the very means and process
of the development of individual rights, for which Englishmen
were continually and earnestly contending. Ours are mere instruments of government, having essentially no higher value than other
local offices, being instituted as these are, for the purpose of devising
and executing certain local regulations which it would be inconvenient and almost impracticable for the Legislature to do by direct
legislation. Their-functions are different from the local offices of
counties and townships, .chiefly -because of a more dense population,
and not at all because of any- constitutional necessity. Properly
speaking, they have no faith to, pledge; because they have no place
in the Constitution, and no guaranty that their existence will be
continued even for a*year; -because, their jurisdiction, limits and
taxing power, may be expandedi contracted and subdivided at the
pleasure of the Legislature; because usually their taxing power is
limited to the mere necessities of their corporate duties, leaving
them little or nothing to answer-other demands upon their plighted
faith; and because the legislative power over them for alteration,
extension and annihilation, cannot- be taken away, and ought.not
to be impeded by their act of -incurring debts-their power ought
to be carefully limited, -for- the -experience of- all municipalities,
ancient and modem, shows that there is always a tendency in corporations to sacrifice individual rights to the interest of the corporate body. A watchful observer of the acts of our own cities -and
towns can point out many instances of this. But it stands written
in every age, in almost every year. of the history of the Grecian
and Italian cities, democratic, oligarchic, or monarchic, and this
disregard of individual rights, was more than anything else, the
cause of their decay.
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The corporation to be aided by the investment, is a rail-road
company. That such is a private corporation has very often been
decided and is not disputed. It is essentially so, for it is not an
instrument of government, and no Legislative declaration can alter
this fact. In it the right of voting is regulated on principles totally
different from the elective franchise of the constitution. It is private and not public, for its province is regulated, not by the constitution and general laws of the land, but by its charter, which
stands as the contract terms of its existence, at least among its
members. It is private, because it is not a law imposed upon any
one by legislative authority; but a plan of union, accepted as such
by persons, voluntarily and each for himself, associating themselves
according to its terms. lie that becomes a member of such a corporation voluntarily gives up so much of his property as he invests
in it; he converts his money or other property into corporation
stock. Besides this, his whole estate may be in some measure
subject to the control of the corporation; for all private corporations may be so constituted that the members m~y be made personally liable for the corporation debts. And this is not all, for if
this may be imposed upon a municipal corporation, it may be
imposed upon any township or ward, or half or tenth part of a
township or ward; for the legislature can subdivide any of them at
pleasure. Nay, they may on the same principle be forced to become members of any private partnership formed for similar purposes, called public.
What, then, is the substance of the proposed measure ; It is to
make a municipal corporation, and therefore all its citizens, and to
some extent, all persons owning property within its limits, members
of a private corporation by an act of government. It is to take
the property of the citizen, by an act of government, and invest it
for him in the stock of a private partnership. It is to take his
credit or his property out of the protection of the State Constitution, and place it under a charter which must thereafter be its only
law. It is to:place it where neither his power as an individual can
control it, nor his vote as a citizen affect it. Under the constitution, he stood as the equal of all men, in the choice of the pfficers
3
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who might affect any of his interests. (Bill of ]Rights, S. 5.)
Under the charter now proposed to be forced upon -him, his voice
is not heard at all, oi ifat all, -most indistinctly and indirectly; for
neither the citizens nor their, municipal representatives m. y have
any voice in chdosing'the znajorit ' of the, rail-road directors, and
the votes which they do give bear no adequate proportid6n either to
their numbers or'theifinteledt. Force-upon them this'new relation, and. as to sd mudh. of their inte~ests, you take away all 'their
rights- as individuals, and as citizens; 'and they are all, so me with
and some without their consnt, made carriers of goods and of
passengers, and liable, in so'me degrbe, to the duties-and the risks
of that relation.
"
Now here is the very questiol of the cause, and I prdceed to its
ihore direct considbration. May gdvernmeAt force* any portion of
the citizens into 6uch *a rel'ation? --May a miinicipal corporaiion
embark the interests of its citizens in the speculations of a private
corporation or partnership? I think it cannot.
"May niot government authorize, municipal corporations to engage
in any sort of 'trade or 'business fbr the public benefit, on the faith
of the taxes it has raised oi has power. to raise?' Yes, it can, if
that is proper govermental business.; but it is not. -And, of dourse,
if the business be not govermeital, government can levy no tti ,to
carry it on. Is the stress laid 'upon the idea of the public benefit
of the business? Then what line of business is there that 'is not
regarded by those engaged in it, as beiiig for the public benefit?
Can proper public business be defined according to -this standard ?
Generally, perhaps, it may; 'and then such. business tts -this is
de'lared to be the indefeasible right of man, as an individual," when it is declared that he-right of acquiring and possessing property'is
indefeasible and inherenf in man, and that it is excepted -out of the
general powers of government.' (S. 1,) This declaration means
nothing if government may convert itself, dr part 'of itself,' into a
trading corporation or socialist bommune, and pledge the credit and
property of the citizens to sustain its schemes of trade. If it may,
then all the guaranties of private property contained" in the declaration of rights are but cob-web restraints upon the'power of govern-
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ment ; for it may pledge all the property of the citizens, by enga,ging in some trading speculation.
I state an extreme case, not that I have any fear that it will
happen, but merely that the principle may stand out with more
prominence. The constitution means that there is a real distinction
between the pursuits of the individual, and the province of the
government; and it marks that distinction as clearly as general
terms will admit. When it declares that the right of the individual
man to "acquire, possess and protect his own property, and procure his own happiness, is inherent and indefeasible," and excludes
it from the province of government; it means that this right shall
not be invaded, and that government shall not undertake to control
tie individual in the exercise of it, either by directing his enterprises, investing his funds, or choosing his associates. If government
can do this at all, in the manner here proposed, there is no limit to
its power, and the whole form of our institutions may be changed
by act of Assembly.
There may, no doubt, be many cases wherein it is difficult to
mark the boundary between the province of the government and
that of the individual citizen; but here there is none, for the line
is distinctly marked by the fact that this particular -business has
been entrusted by law lo private hands, and is subjected to the law
that governs private relations. Can the citizens be compelled to
enter into such a relation ?
The attempt is forbidden by the Constitutional declaration that
the right of the people "to alter, reform or abolish their government," that is, all govermental institutions, is "unalienable and
indefeasible." (S. 2.) Admit the solecism that government may
force any portion of its citizens into membership in an institution
in which contract is the essential bond; then either this relation
stands without its proper contract consequences, and you abolish
the essential and constitutional distinction between contract relations and legal ones, including the inviolability of the former, which
is impossible or government has power to establish institutional
relations among the citizens, which neither it nor they can "alter,
reform or abolish." That is, government can establish social rela-

86

SHARPLESS vs. THE MAYOR, &c., OF PHILADELPHIA.

tions among the citizens-contract, and yet govermental-which
neither it nor the people can change; because our Constitution forbids the government, and the Constitution .of the United States
forbids both government and people from "impairing the obligations of' contracts."
Such interferente with piivate rights, is excluded by the Constitutional rule, in favor of the .inviolability of contracts. (S. 17.)
This rule involves theidea, that those. individual rights, which are
the proper subject of contract, and in so far .as they are so, may be
placed beyond the jurisdiction of govermental rules, -by the mere
will of .indiViduals expressed in 'a contract. This shows that contract relations are higher..in degree than those established by law,
and that rules of law are intended to define the relations .between
individuals, only when they have' not themselves fully defined them
by an agreement. Thus the common law maxi, conventio 'Vincit
Zegem, acquires new authority from the Constitutioiiand it may be,
its province is enlarged. Contract relations being thus placed
above legal ones, it'necessarily follows that. the law cannot force
them upon any. one. 'If, then, this is to -be regarded as a contract
relation in its character and consequences, it is one that th6 law
making power cannot institute in,
any form. If it is not !a contract
relation, then it is a govermental one and may be dis'solved by the
power thatcreated it.'- The obligation, being inposed•.by law, may
be discharged in the. same way. Its contract form does -not alter
the case, for its legal character depends upon its. essence, and: not
upon ita'form; otherwise power could make its owk forms the
means of justifying the most palpable usurpation.
The incongruity, of the ptoceeding, presents itself in strong light,.
if we take into consideration the rule 'which has been so often
affirmed, that the charter of a private corporation is placed by'the
Constitution of the United States entirely beyond the reach of, all
state power. It is said that over sixty millions of dollars are invested and proposed to be inivested in this way, in several states under
various act's of 'Assembly. This •amount is- equal to the assessed
valuation of the property in-about half of the counties and half the
territory of this state, taking the )more thinly populated parts. The
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amount may be over-estimated, but that is not important. What
then is the proposition? It is to place all this amount of property
under the control of private chartered corporations. Not by the
individual will of each property holder acting for himself, but by
the will of the gov6rnment. That is, government interferes with
private property in order to place it beyond the control both of the
individual and of the government. It exercises power in order to
abdicate power, or rather to transfer it to private hands. The
property whose relations were subject to the rules of the law and
the Constitution, is outlawed-banished its relations-and sent into
the desolate exile of a private corporation, where it can claim only
an exile's rights, and where the voice of the law and of the constitution is unheard, and the equal ballot of the independent freeman
is disregarded. Here is diminutio capitis and no jus postliminii.
To my mind, it seems very plain that this measure is in violation
of the whole spirit of the declaration of rights. It violates especially the first section, by undertaking to control the citizen in the
investment of his funds and the choice of his business. It violates
the second, by imposing upon him an institution which neither the
government nor the people can alter or abolish. It violates the
fifth, by imposing an institution, wherein the electivd franchise is
taken away. It violates the ninth, by taking the property of the
citizen by a special act, and without trial. It violates the seventeenth, by making the citizen a member of a private partnership
without his consent. The eleventh would be violated, if we should
shut the doors of this Court against him, and refuse him a prompt
and full remedy. And the very nature of government is violated
by government erecting over its citizens an institution which it
cannot control.
I have now finished my direct argument of the point which strikes
me as the pivot of the case; but I cannot avoid the belief, that a
glance at the history of the development of private rights, which
resulted in producing the ideas embodied in our declaration of rights,
will tend to show that I have not misunderstood those ideas.
Perhaps all the internal political contests that the world has ever
witnessed have been, consciously or unconsciously, contests for the
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natural rights qf individuals. Superficially regarded, they seem to
have been mere contests for power. But it is far otherwise, in
them, all the sentiment is, that the individual has been wronged by
the government; and the contest therefore,-is for indiidual right,
rather than for power. Power over others is a-means of advancing
the individual; and for this purpose, the selfish and overbearing
will seek an undue share of it; but the mass of the -people will
never seek it for its own- sake; but because they believe that their
natural and individual rights will be more respected, the more their
influence in the government is felt.
It is doubtless true, that the right of the individual as against
government, did not develope itself in the consciousness of the
Grecian and Roman altiquity; for a stae of almost constant
external war is peculiarly unfavorable to its development. When
martial law is the normal state of a. people's institutiohs, man is
useful only as an element and instrument of society; and individual
rights are merged in the sodality of the state. Withi them, power
was the means by which the burdens of war were cast in such a
manner as to weigh least hetvily on those -that ruled. With them
the nation's'glory was measured by the nation's extent, and by its
power over other nations, and not by the intelligence, and virtue
and liberty. of its citizens. The highest aim of society was boundless dominion, and thehighest aim of the individual was the chief
seat in the kingdom. Equality of -rights was unknown to them
except as the portion of the ruling caste,, who arrogated to them.
selves all power. That individuals had iights independent of law,
was a principle which they never comprehended. With them power
was absolute, and the highest merit was martial skill, and hence.
might and law, valor'and virtue, were identical terms.
All matters fell within- the province of government. Religion,
arts, trades, education, amusements, were the subjects of legislation.
Not only the means, but the very form and essence of education
and religion, were under the control of the state. Socrates was
sacrificed for his efforts in the cause of education and progress, and
Plato received a hint that some of the hemlock of his master's cup
was left for him.
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It was never so, but in an exceptional way, with the race of
people from whom we derived our origin and. our principles. As
far back as history marks the progress of the Germanic tribes,
liberty and independence was the motto on their banners. Personal
independence was part of their govermental common law, and therefore part of their Constitution. It was the natural result of their
national origin. Their's was the natural and spontaneous growth
of a rural and homogeneous people, whose numbers were increased
by the arts of peace, and by a virtuous regard for the family relation, and whose virtues and energies were developed by their conquests of the mountains and marshes, and forests and wild beasts
of the earth, and under a government, free, unencroaching, and
adapted to their circumstances. Roman development was from a
city centre, by the arts of war, by the conquest and enslavement of
their fellow men, always proceeding in disregard of individual
rights, and, in order to maintain its position, requiring a government that disregarded them.
And when the German people invaded and conquered the Western Roman empire, war brought with it an analogous disregard of
individuals rights, and fixed it among the institutions of government, by the establishment of the feudal system. But in England
the idea was soon reclaimed as constitutional common law, and vindi.cated in Magna Charta; and since then the whole history of
England is one continual protest against govermental invasions of
private rights; and hu reads history badly who regards it as a protest against merely royal power.
Definitions'of the utmost boundaries of right and of authority,
are not so common in England as here; because with them the
system is in continual progress: and because general principles are
not so much the means of a nation's growth, as inductions from its
experience and history. In the revolution of 1789, France endeavored to invert this order and to set out by a course founded on
philosophy and general principles. But it was a failure, because
the people were not ready for it. A nation is not born in a day.
The principles on which it acts and by'which it advances, are the
spontaneous accretions of its natural growth, becoming evolved as
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needed, and adapted as evolved. David's sling seemed an insignificant weapon, but it suited him better than a sword, helmet and coat
of mail. But the statesmen of the French National Assembly,
properly defined the English and American idea of liberty, and presented a just generalization of the facts of history, when in 1780
they declared that "it consists in the ability to do any thing not
injurious to others, and the natural rights of every man. are only
thus limited."
They understood the right of property, when they declared that
it was "inviolable and sacred, and no one could be deprived of it,
except when. the -public necessity, legally established, 'clearly required it; and then only on condition of just and previous compensation." They understood the province of. government, when they
declared that "the end: of all association is the preservatiofi of the
natural and.imprescriptible rights of man. These iights are liberty,
security, property and resistence to oppression." All this is involved in the personal liberty, personal security and private pioperty
guarantied as the natural and inherent rights of every Englishman,
and especially of every Pennsylvanian, all being necessary as
motives, encouragements, instruments and rewards of that personal
virtue and energy, that are necessary to individual, and, therefore,
to national development. It-is all involved in the very religion
which they profeas, and which teaches that every man'has his own
conscience, his own duties, his -own will, his own intelligence, his
own future.
I say the general mind of France had mot yet been trained tb
these high ideas of libertyj and they did not constitute part of the
nations consciousness. Hence the days of Robespierre, when it
was fancied that the laws of the fabulous or mythical Lycurgus
were the true cure of all political ills. This' was the vefy reverse
of the enlightened political principles of National Assembly; for
under those laws, individual liberty had no existence, Government
directed all things.
Americans could commit no such error. They had been trained
in the principles of English liberty, and had regularly and spontaneously outgrown them, their principles and institfitions being de-
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veloped together. Our whole provincial life was a struggle against
govermental encroachments upon individual rights, and was the
means of training us for a goverment of our own, by developing in
us the principles embodied in our State Constitution, as "the general, great, and essential principles of liberty and free government."
Our whole declaration of rights stands as a monument of the
regard which the peopfe of the state have for the independence and
protection of individual rights, and every line is marked with this
principle. All our American Constitutions show that it is also an
American principle, and it has been attempted to be introduced
into the policy of most of the nations of Europe. 'T he new clause,
article 7, section 4, added in amending the Constitution, and providing that the.Legislature shall not give any corporation or individual, the privilege of taking private property for public use,
without compensation first paid or secured, is only a 'more adequate
form of securing a well established principle, theretofore often invaded by the provision of a fruitless remedy. Under such a constitution, and within the prohibited limits, private rights are safe against
the voice and act of even unanimous millions, unless they are
w£l1ing to stand self branded as usurpers and tyrants: and I cannot
doubt that the provisions of the bill of rights to which I have heretofore referred, do most expressly protect the citizen from the
govermental invasion of his rights that is here intended.
Let us not be afraid of unduly reducing the province of government. The social principle is always strong enough to prevent
this, and the tendency of events is always in the contrary direction.
It is too common, the wish to cure all social ills, and advance all
social projects, by the power of government. It is too common the
wish to place the industry, enterprize and morality of the people,
under the care of the state: though all history proves that they
sicken and decay under the influence of large govermental powers,
and that, in Christian lands, they revive and flourish under the
spirit of individualism, which is.natural to man, and which can be
properly developed only where the pragmatism of the state is
excluded. The state is no proper leader in any such matters. It
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is delegated not to devise plans of acquiring wealth and securing
happiness; but to protect individuals in the proper pursuit of their
own lawful plans-not to guide enterprize into new channels and
new undertakings; but to protect those already entered upon, and
to keep open and improve their avenues. Man advances only by
pursuing his own ideal of morality and enterprize; and this he
pursues with an energy proportioned to the brightness of the rewards which his- own .eye discovers in it. When 'government
interferes in such matters, it truly represents those only who suggest the plan; and. they only will appreciate the ideal that it, is
intended to embody or realize; and they only, and not" the people
generally, can be relied on to give it effect. And so here, a small
band of individual stockholders are likely to have the coitrol of
the millions of municipal subscriptions nowy proposed ito be-made.in
this and other cases, and the very proposition to -make them, has
prevented an incalculable amount of individual subscription, and set
aside that much- of the individual energy, forecast and watchfulness so necessary to the success of such enterprises. The laborer
will not tax his own energies when Hercules undertakes his works,
and he will be equally backward if Herciles attempt to control him.
The vast majority of the people desire to be aJlowed to mind their.
own business in their own way, 'and it is this majority.that ought
to be regarded. And when the government undertakes to meddle
with them, at the call .of noisy speculators seeking public favors,
no amount of official majorities can purge the deed of its tyrannical
character.
Besides this, all history.proves that the corruption of government
increases with its powers, and that its purity, and therefore its per-.
formance, depend much upon the limitation of its jurisdiction.
When its power is large,-there are strong, and even ferocious, contests to get the use of its power. Even the power of passing private
laws, authorizing private corporations, directing public, improvements, and appropriating public money, has subjected government
to the worst temptations, and given rise to intrigue, fawning and
favoritism, and. has annually attracted to our capitols swarms of
voracious and unprincipled speculators, disgracing' the public char-
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acter, and causing more than one government to be publicly suspected and charged with corruption, and honest visitors there to be
suspected of selfish and dishonest purposes. Every exertion of
power that increases its patronage by enlarging its functions, should
be watched with suspicion, for it increases the temptations to corruption, endangers the purity of those in power, casts a shade upon
the character, and lowers the standard of public morality.
Our govermental stability depends much upon the absence of
temptations to corruptions, and upon our reverence for the principle that the natural rights of the individual Are sacred against the
touch of government. Society was made for man, not man for
society. Born to live in society, his virtue, intelligence and energy,
are developed by it; and by the intercourse and competitions and
efforts to which it naturally gives rise; and repressed and discouraged when attempted to be governed and forced by it. The natural
disposition to appropriate is part of man's individualism. Upon it
depends the very right of property, and without it, the positive gift
of dominion over the earth would have been ineffectual. If it is
unduly restrained or interfered with, the emulations which -are at
the bottom of all the energetic competitions upon which the propress of a people depends, will be most seriously affected. Men's
energies are never so well expended and so fully exercised, as when
left to the guidance of their own motives, tastes and intelligence.
People will not and cannot work under the direction and compulsion
of the state, with anything like the same effect as when their occupation and pursuits are chosen by themselves, and urged on by
their own hopes and their own will.
It was, I believe, this experience and these reasons that called
for our bill of rights, and they illustrate the propriety of the application which I desire to make of its principles. With most profound respect for those who differ from me, I must be allowed to
say, that it is a long stride towards the very worst form of government, as applied to a nation--socialism. I think the injunction
ought to be granted, for the reasons given above, and for the reasons given by my brother Lewis.

EX PARTE ALEXANDER.

Louisville Olhancery Court, Kentucky, July, 1853
RX ?ARTE ALEXANDER.
1. The refusal of a writ of habeas corpus by one Court, is no bar to an application
to another Court.
2. A Court can, on habeas corus, deliver a party from imprisonment for a contempt
of Court, where the Court committing the party has transcended its authority by
excess of punishment, or by a punishment unknown to the law. But the question of contempt, if the Court had authority over it, will not be inquired into on
habeas corpus; nor will a..writ of error lie in such case; for every Court must be
sole judge of the contempts against itself.
3. Cases of contempt were not cases for juries at common law, or under the Constitution ; .and the statute does not now require a jury to find the imprisonment
beyond a day, where an order of the Court has been violated.
4. When we adopted the common law in this country, we did not adopt all the
power exercised under it; but American principles regulate the power.
5. A commitment for contempt "suntU thefurther order of the Court," is void.
6. The power to punish contempts is a power only of necessity-what ought to be
done where a party cannot strictly comply with an order of Court.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
C. Ale~xander petitions this Court
for a writ-of habeas corpus, to be discharged from the jail 6f JefferPIRTLE, CHANELLOR-James

son county, to which hewas committed by the order ofthe Jefferson
Circuit Court. The record of the Circuit Court is referred to, and
it is agreed that" the Court shall grant, or refuse the writ, as the
commitment shall be deemed'valid, or invalid; and so the case has
been heard on its-merits, without waiting for a return of the jailor
to a writ.
The Circuit Court made .a decree for the sale of infants' real
estate, and appointed- Alexander a commissioner to make the sale,
and ordered-the "notes for the purchase money to be returned to
Court subject to the order of Court." Alexander made the sale,
and, instead of returning the notes to the Court, he- collected the
money on one of them, amounting to $711, and delivered the
note to the purchaser. This fact appearing in his report, made in
response to a rule against him, the Court ordered an attachment
for a contempt "in failing to payr into Court". the sum of money.
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When brought in on the attachment, he stated on oath that he was
the administrator of one Cochran; that he was appointed the Commissioner to sell the lot bf land belonging to the estate; and he
was advised he had blended the duties of the two offices, and had
been advised that it was his duty to collect the notes, which he had
taken as commissioner; that he was not able to pay the money, and
that he meant no contempt to the Court. The Court ordered him
to be committed to the jail, "until the further order of the Court
for a contempt offered in violating the dearee of sale." This was
on the 18th of June. It seems another order was made on the
16th of June, which I do not see in the transcript of the record.
On .the 22d of June, an order reads; "James C.'Alexander, the
Commissioner in this case having failed to pay into Court on this
day, as he was required to do by an order of this Court, made
herein on the 16th of, June, the amount of money by him collected,
in disobedience to, and in violation of the order of the Court in
-this case, and he appearing in Court, and failing and refusing to
pay said amount, and he' having violated the orders made heretofore herein, it is ordered that he be recommitted to jail until the
further order of the Court, for the contempt offered by him in disobeying and violating said orders of this Court; and it is further
ordered and decreed, that he pay the amount by him collected of
Israel Hyman, the purchaser, into Court, for the use and benefit
of said Hyman." In the same order, Hyman having insisted on
his purchase, and declining to say whether he was willing to pay
again the $711, the Court refused to confirm the sale, and ordered
the property to be resold.
Afterwards, Alexander moved to be discharged from prison;
among other things, "because it was impossible for him to re.turn
the note into Court, it being in possession of Hyman, the purchaser,
and because the Court had no power to make the order requiringhim to pay the money into Court for the use and benefit of said
Hyman ;" and he filed several affidavits showing his inability to
raise money.. The Court overruled his motion.
It appearing to tho Court, on the suggestion of Hlyman's counsel, on the same day, (28d June,) that Alexander was at large, an
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.ittachment was ordered against him; and on the next day, when
he was brought in, the Court considering that he had been illegally
discharged, again orde.ed "that he stand committed for such- contempt, until the further order of the Court." It seems he had
been discharged by two justices of the peace, supposing they had
power to do so, under the law, for the benefit of insolvent debtors.
On the 28th of June, Alexander's counsel presented his petition
to the Circuit Court, praying a writ of habeas corpus,setting forth,
substantially, the same complaint of illegal imprisonment which is
contained in the petition to this Court. The Court refused the
writ.
1. The refusal of that Court to grant the writ of habeas corpus
is no bar to an application here. Even if the writ had been granted,
and the case flly heard upon the return made to it, and a formal
order made of record, refusing a discharge from imprisonment' the
writ now applied for might be granted by this Court. Proceedings
refusing the benefit of a habeas corpus iill always Ie considered
with deference and respect, when application is made to another
tribunal; but they are not final-they do not stand as judgments,'
and do not bar, any more than the refusal of a supersedas or an
order for an injunction out of Court.
2. Can the habeas corpus be granted where the party is imprisoned for a'contempt, by a.Court having power to punish contempts ?
This writ was the privilege df every Englishman at the common
law, when he was imprisoned confrary to the law of the land.- It
'was a privilege belonging to him, derived from his Saxon aficestors,
which was not to be withheld in any instance, unless he was detained by a lawful power, lawfully exerted. His privilege was wide.
as that of a citizen of-Rome, except that he had to apply in his own
name, whereas every Ro'an citizen could apply to the pretor'for
himself, or any other Roman, for an Interdict, having substantially the effect of the habeas corpus of the common law.
The statutes -of 16 Charles 1st and 31 Charles 2d, regulating
proceedings on habeas corpus, are more in detail than our statute;
and while they were intended to preserve the common law privilege,
they made exceptions to the granting of the writ in some cases,
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which have operated, in the opinion of some Courts, as restrictions
.on the privilege. But these are restrictions to the action of the
judge who grants the writ in vacation. He has not the power to
release "persons convict," or to discharge a person brought before
him, if it appears that he is detained "upon any legal process out
of a Court having jurisdictionof criminalmatters." This was the
constant practice before the statute, even if a judge in vacation
could issue the writ before the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act,
4 Jobns, Rep. 358. But where the Court awarded the writ, the
authority, and the whole of the authority, by which the party was
detained, was examined. I do not mean the regularity or the
clearness from error in its exercise, but the validity, the lawfulness
of the authority.
I do not know an instance where the Courts of England, in
modern times, have declined to look into the authority by which a
man has beeni imprisoned. They have, (and always will do so, I
have no doubt,) declined to examine the merits of the judgment on
this writ; but where the judgment does not belong to the tribunal
to give, they have not failed to say so. In the great and leading
case of the Lord Mayor of London, 8 Wils. Rep. 198, Ch. Justice
De Grey says, "The writ by which the Lord Mayor is now brought
before us,.is a habeas corpus at common law." "This is a writ by
which the subject has the right to the remedy of being discharged
out of custody, if he hath been committed, and is detained contrary
to law; therefore the Court must consider, whether the authority
committing is a legal authority; if the commitment is made by
those who have authority to commit, this Court cannot discharge
or bail the party committed." The Court in this case, looked upon
the House of Commons as a Court having power to punish cantempts; and because the Court of Common Pleas did not know,
judicially, what was the law of contempts in that House, or what
its punishment was-it decided that it was bound to remand the
prisoner to the Tower. At page 200, De Grey says, "We do not
know, certainly, the jurisdiction of the House of Commons; we
cannot judge of the laivs and privileges of the House, because we
have no knowledge of those laws and privileges; we cannot judge
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of the contempts thereof-we cannot judge of the punishment
therefore." And at page 205, Mr. Justice Blackstone says, "it is
our duty to presume the orders of thtat House and their execution,
are according to law.' Now, certainly, these expressions imply
that if the Court could form a judgment with regard to the punishment inflicted by that Court, (the House of Commons,) and was not
left to presume the orders of that Court and their execution were
according to law, the Common Pleas would, if it had found the
House had exceeded its authority, have discharged the Lord Mayor.
Power is not to be considered lawful authority, barely. because it is
exercised by a Court.' It may not be lawful. It is sometimes
erroneously exercised, scarcely ever beyond the point of lawfulness;
but it is possible to be so, even in the highest tribunals.
The Habeas Corpus Act in this State, as far as the..cases to
which the writ is applicable are concerned, is a -mere re-enactment
of the common law. After having stated what officers shall grant
the writ, the 3d section provides-" The writ of habeas corpus shall
be granted forthwith by any of the officers enumerated in the first
section of this article, to any person who shall apply for the same
by petition, showing by affidavit or other evidence, probable -ause
to believe he is detained without lawful authority." The law
standing so, this Court is bound to inquire into the lawfulness of
the commitment, although it is a commitment by a high court, and
for a contempt to that Court. This is a case in court, not in vacation, (if there could be any difference under our statute,) and-this
Court is bound to.proceed as at common law.
The power to punish contempts is necessary to the administration of justice. It belongs to courts for the purpose of upholding
the authority, respect , and dignity, not of the judge, but of the law.
Without this power, the law itself must, many times, fall in weakness, its solemn injunctions be the sound of mockery;. and with the
Courts, justice must sink into -contempt. This power must, from the
very nature of the cases that call for its exercise, be much left to
discretion;- sometimes as to when it shall be used; and sometimes
as to the manner in which it shall be exerted. It is impossible for
legislation to foresee and provide, for all instances. To attempt to
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do so, would lead to embarrassment and confusion, and it would
often be to leave the redress of wrongs not to be found in the law.
The power may be abused-so may other necessary power; but
that has never been a sufficient reason for taking away power, or
for not trusting it 'in any instance. We have, from the nature of
society, to intrust men. No civil institutions are perfect, because
they are made by men, and must be carried on by men who are
fallible. This it is fritless to regret or complain of, for it cannot
find remedy. The dispatch, promptitude and command with which
some of the action of Courts of Justice must be conducted, require
some things to'be left to the judge, looking to the responsibility of
his own conscience as an elevated man; to the public sentiment as to
hardness and cruelty, and to the law-for all are respdnsible to the
law. This doctrine of the necessary power over contempts has
existed ever since the law had any history. It would be useless to
quote books to show that the experience of society proves what I
say. To support this necessary power in a proper manner, the
revised statutes, page 215, say, "That no writ of error, or appeal,
shall lie 'from an order or judgment of any Court punishing a contempt.' " This was the common law. It has had the sanction of
ages. In the case of Tohnson vs. Commonwealth, 1 Bibb, 602, the
Court of Appeals, says, "The great purposes for which Courts are
instrusted with the power of punishing contempts, demands a speedy
and summary proceeding, not consisting with delays consequent
upon writs of error or appeals." After a few sentences, the Court
goes on to express these important truths. "In fact, the rights,
liberties and property of the whole community are immediately
involved and interested in the support of the constituted authorities.
What are laws without the means competent to enforce and secure
a due obedience? To this end, a power in courts of justice to suppress contempts and disobedience to their authority, by immediate
punishment, is essentially necessary, and results from the very first
principles of judicial establishments. Laws are necessary to the
good order of society; Courts are ordained by the laws, as necessary for their due adniinistration ; hence due respect for the courts
is as essentially necessary as a regard for the laws themselves : for
4
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when once such respect is lost among the people, the authority of
the Court is at an end." The Court proceeds to say, "One Court
cannot judge of a contempt committed against another. In fine it
seems necessary to the very existence of a court in the healthy exercise of its powers, that it should have exclusive jurisdiction to
judge of contempts to its authority,"
"But it may, perhaps, be asked, if each Court is suffered to exercise the power, of punishing contempts, where is the security of
the citizen against the arbitary oppression of the judge, by a wilful
infraction of the law. Itis answered that the citizen finds security
in his own correct demieanor, in the great lenity and unwillingness
which has g~nerally been remarked in courts, to resort to this exercise of their powers, but above all, in that responsibility which
the judge owes to the assembled representation of the country, for
any corrupt or wilful and arbitary abuse of his powers."
"Governinent cannot be administered without committing powers
in trust and confidence."
There are countless other powers than that in regard to contempts, of great importance, daily exercised, and -which mu8t be
exercised in the sound judgment of the Court. And yet, in the
nature of things much wrong, and in somhe instances, much oppression might be done. What could be more oppressive than to refuse
bail where it should be granted? or worse than to demand excessive
bail, so that it operates with the same hardship? yet ihese must be
left, and have always been left in the discretion of the judge.
This Court cannot deliver any person lawfully committed by the
Circuit Court for contempt. It cannot, on Aabeas corpu8, inquire
into the question of contempt. But if there should be a commitment in an instance where there could be no contempt, as where a
Court should adjudge a -man guilty of contempt, who was not; in
any sense, before the Court, as, forinstance, (and the supposition
is very remote,) where a man should be ordered to pay a debt, who
was not an officer of the Court, in any sense, and against whom
there was no suit or proceeding, and he should be imprisoned for
disobedience of the order, the proceeding then would be coram non
Judice, and the order merely void; So if the Court has jurisdiction
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regularly, and in the commitment exceeds the power of the law;
*as if a man should be committed for life for disobedience of a lawful
order; or should be committed to the pillory instead of the jail,
then he should be released by habeas corpus. These are very
extravagant instances, but they serve to illustrate.
The doctrine that one Court cannot relieve against the lawful
commitment of another Court, is clearly stated in many cases; but
I need not cite more than the case of the Lord Mayor before referred to, and the case of J. . N. Yates, 4 Johns. Rep. 315. I
know this case was reversed by the Senate of New York, but I
have no sufficient evidence that it was on this point; and if it were,
I should regard the opinions of Kent and Thompson, and Van Ness,
more than the vote of the Senate. The learned Counsel for the
petitioner, in his able argument, seemed to think that Ch. J. Kent
had approved a decision of the King's Bench, in the time of Charles
1st, which refused to discharge a prisoner lawlessly committed by
the Star Chamber. But this is a mistake. Chambers' Case, Oro.
Car. 168, quoted by Kent, was a case of contempt in open Court
by insulting language; and the King's Bench barely decided that
it could not deliver a man from a lawful commitment; for although
the Star Chamber had much odious and tyrannical power given
it in timp of Henry 7th,. and Henry 8th, yet it was one of the
ancient Courts of the realm, and had a portion of legitimate power;
and that exercised was of such character. The severity of the punishment, however, in that case, would now be deemed beyond the
power of any Court for such an offence.
8. Had the Court jurisdiction to commit in the case? I think it
had. The failure to return the note, and the receiving and using
the money, were a high contempt of the authority of the law, calculated to degrade the administration of justice, to destroy confidence in the Courts of Kentucky, and they actually did defeat
justice in its own course. Such instances call for the immediate
action of the Court.
But it is contended that, as the note had been put out of the
power of Alexander, the imprisonment could not produce it, and
thus the order taken could not operate a remedy for the infants,
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but was merely punitory, and must come within the 1st section of
Article 24, of the Revised Statutes, which, in general language,
does not allow imprisonment for contempt exceeding one day without the intervention of a jury, page 273. And it is also contended
that if this section applies, then the commitment, being void for
this, should be deemed void as to the money too; and the party
should be discharged. I do not see the force of the laut position.
Why should it be void in tote, because the party is committed for
two things, "until further order ?" If he should have been committed for one thing, he ought not to be let out, because he ought
not to have been committed for another. If a man were committed
on a charge 'f felony, until, &c., and also for something out of the
power of the law, he should not be discharged of the commitment
for that which demanded his imprisonment...
There is some difference in the language of the 10th section of
the Article just referred to, and the 3rd section of the Act of 1798;
but I think the same construction should be given to the new law,
which was given to the old. After making the same provision in
substance, about calling a jury, the act of 1798 says: "This act
is not intended nor shall be construed to affect cases where a party
served with process from any Court, juage or justice, shall refuse
to answer according to law, or to perform any decree,-judgment or
order of the same." Until this law was passed, requiring a jury
in certain cases, there "was no certain fixed time, beyond which a
man might not be imprisoned for- any contempt of Court, without
calling a.jury; contempts were not jury cases at common law, or
under the constitution ; and when the legislature restricted the
power of the Court without a jury, to one day's imprisonment by
the 1st section of the.act of 1798, it was careful in the 3rd section
t6 leave the power of the Court in such cases as this of Alexande:s,
to the common law. And such was'the universal judgment of the
Courts of Kentucky. Whether the Court punished the contempt
done in violating its lawful order or decree, for the purpose of vindicating the law and its authority in the administration of justice;
or whether the punishment was to operate also as a remedy for a
party litigant, there was no difference at common law, and none
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after the passage of that statute. But surely where the Court is
called on to imprison a man merely to vindicate the law and its
authority in the Courts, and the process of its Courts, it should be,
as our Courts have always been, very careful not to inflict any punishment not imperiously demanded by this important object. Any
thing of hardness or cruelty would defeat the purpose aimed at, and
'bring the Court into odium. If a jury were called in cases provided for by the statute; and excessive fine or imprisonment were
found, such as the Court did not approve, it would be the duty of
the judge to inflict less than the verdict called for; and he would
not be so far bound by the verdict as in a case of an indictment for
a misdemeanor.
The 10th section of the article quoted, says, that "'nothing in
this article shall be construed to prevent any Court or judge thereof
from proceeding against any person writing or publishing a libel,
or slanderous words, of and concerning such Court or judge in relation to his judicial conduct in Court, by indictment or presentment, nor from prohibiting any Court or judicial tribunal from
punishing any person guilty of a contempt in resisting or disobeying
any judicial order or process issued by, or under the authority of
such Court or judicial tribunal or officer." This is a section not
very carefully written. But we cannot suppose it was intended
that a grand jury should be called; or that there should be a punishment for the violation of the order of the Court, only by the
verdict of a jury; for there is not one word in the article that could
have been construed to prevent the punishment for violating an
order, &c., if a jury was called. It must then have been intended,
as was the 3rd section of the act of 1793, to reserve the power of
the Court, without the verdict of a jury to vindicate the orders, &c.,
of the Court. Any other construction would require, the Court to
have the verdict of a jury every time an injunction should be violated, or an order disregarded to file books, deeds or other papers, or
to pay money into Court by a receiver of the Court, or other officer,
or even to file an answer. Such a course would stop the wheels of
justice, and render the necessary orders of the Court merely nugatory. A great portion of the jurisdiction of this Court, so necessary
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on these matters, in favor of boatmen in enforcing quick payment
of their wages, would be practically lost.
The Court of Appeals in the case of Bickley vs. The Cominonwealthl 2 J. J. Marsh, 572, decided, that although according to the
case of John8ton vs.' The Commonwealth, (which was approved> that
Court had not jurisdiction to re-try the contempt, yet it had power
on a writ of error to reverse so much of an order as exceeded the
power of the Court below. In the case of Patton vs. The Commonwealtl, at the present term, that Court had before it an order
committing the plaintiff until certain sums of money were paid;
yet, although the Court took jurisdiction as to the sums of money,
they being too large, it said nothing of the excess of power without
ajury, which could not have been disregarded if the 1st section
aforesaid, applied to such cases; for then there would have been an
excess of .poweri and the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to correct the order, as decided in the case of Bickley.
4. But it is contended that the money was not collected by Alexander as a commissioner of the Court; that the Court set aside the
sale because it could not be received by him; and having set aside
the sale, the Court had no more jurisdiction as to the money; and
Hyman must have his remedy by suitable action, as in other cases
of indebtment. It does not seem to me so. He received the money
on the note, which as -commissioner he had taken, and which had
been plainly ordered to be returnqd to the Court. The relation in
which he stood when he received it, made it the duty of the Court to
see that Hyman did not lose his money, or that the infants, whose
lands were sold, should have it.
That his office of commissioner had terminated could make no
difference in the duty of the Court. In the case of Bagley, vs.
Yates and Prentiss,where a deputy marshal had received money
due upon a judgment after he had returned the execution, the Court
issued an attachment against him for not paying it over; 3 McLean's
Rep. 465. But in that case it could not have been said that he
received the money strictly as a deputy marshal; his principal
would not have been liable; yet he stood in such a relation to the
Court when he ieceived it, that it was the duty of the judge to see
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that he did not degrade the justice of the Court, whose minister he
was.
5. But it is said the Court had no authority to sell the estate of
infants; and therefore the whole proceeding was coram nonjudice,
and void. I think the Court had the power. But whether it had
the power to order a sale of the estate or not, the party stood in
the same relation to the Court, as to -this note and this sum of
money; just as much ufder its supervision in the one instance as
the other. And, if it were found out that the Court could not
decree a good title to Hyman, it at once became, on that account,
the duty of the Court to order back to him his money.
6. It is contended that Chap. 51 of the Revised Statutes, concerning insolvent debtors, authorized the justices of the peace to discharge the party from the jail. The 5th section says: "The
provisions of this chapter shall apply to a person imprisoned by'
order of a Court of Chancery, to compel the payment of money
under a decree or judgment of such Court." I do not think the
statute applies even to such part of the order as has a reference to
the non-payment of the money. It is not a commitment until he
pay the money; but it is for the contempt in not having paid it,
and "'till the further order of the Court." But, be this as it may,
the act only applies to case' of a "decree or judgment." It could
not have been intended to apply to cases where orders, not decrees,
are made against the officers of a Court for abusing their authority,
and failing to comply with the orders of the Court to restore the
abuse. The distinction between decrees to pay money, and such
orders, is well understood. The Court orders its receiver, its commissioner or its marshal, to pay money into Court. On this no
execution issues; but the Court enforces compliance summarily,
and keeps charge of the subject 'till it is ended; and if it should
become necessary for the honor of the country's justice, to commit
one of these officers, the two justices of the peace have nothing to
do with the matter. It would be preposterous if they had. The
decree is generally for the payment of money, on this an execution
issues, as a matter of course; and it is not necessary to comply
with the decree, that the money should be brought into Court. The
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decree is always in favor of 'some person by name; and it is made
in conformity to pleadings, such as bills, answers, cross-bills, petitions ; the order is not frequently so, and may not be directed at
all by them. It is frequently made to pay money into Court, when
it is not yet known what party is to have it. The Revised Statutes, page -317,require a copy of the schedule of the insolvent's
property he intends to surrender, to be furnished the -plaintiff, or
his attorney, ten days before he is allowed to take the oath. Now,
in many cases, on an order to pay money in, it could not 1e known
who should have notice; but in cases of decrees it is always known.
It is true, the word "decree" is.
in the order in this instance, but
that does not change the import. The money was to be paid into
Court. Besides, this word is only in the last order, on which the
party was not in custody for violation.
The order,. distinct from the decree, is under the control of the
Court, from-day to day, and from term to term, and may be revoked or modified, as justice may demand ; and, for this reason, it
cannot be, that one committed under it can be discharged by the
'justices. This would frustrate the necessary power of the Court.
A decree, such as spoken of in the statute, is final, and cann6t be
modified at a subsequent term.
7. It is contended that the order of commitment is void, because
it is "until further order of the Court."
If the order trinscenals the power of the Court, in such an instance as this, it will be void, and'the party must be dischargd;
for it is not like other commitments for.want of bail, &c., where, if
it appear that the party ought to be detained, le will not be absolutely discharged for a defect in the mittimus.
The power to imprijon for contempts is derived merely and absolutely from the necessity of the case, nQ further punishment, therefore, can be lawfully inflicted than'is necessary in the strictest
sense; and if. discretion must be given in this country, it must
likewise be with-held where it is not impracticable to do so. It may
have been 'the English practice .to commit for contempts until
further order. The statute of Westm. 2, 18 Edw. 1, provided that
persons who resisted the process of the King's Courts or the Sheriff,
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should be summarily imprisoned during the King's pleasure. All
the commitments for contempt made by the House of Commons,
have been, as far as I have seen, during the pleasure of the House.
But because these kinds of commitments might be made in England,
and might even consort with the genius of the old common law, I
do not think they have been adopted by, or consort with, our free
institutions, where no power exists but for the public good, and no
one's pleasure is to be consulted or regarded. On such subjects we
cannot, with safety, turn to the usage of the English Courts, or to
the acts of Parliament, centuries ago, nor up to the time of our
separation from that Empire. When we adopted the common law,
it cannot be said that we adopted all the power exercised under it;
nor did we engage society to stand still; but we have lbft much of
its harshness far behind us. Indeed, our enlarged and advancing
public sentiment has gone far beyond what is still left 'tanding oni
our statute books as a memento of the rudeness of former days. If
we open the old statutes of Kentucky, we shall find the ducking
stool and the pillory; and we will find the abominable practice of
the common law formally enacted by the statute of 1796, (and forgotten to be repealed by our Revisors,) that condemned a man to
be executed for standing mute on his arraigment, or challenging a
number of-jurors beyond what the law allowed ! 1 Morehead and
Brown, 528. These barbarisms we trust are repealed by the new
Constitution, as it has repeated the words of the old since they were
enacted. They have been abrogated and forgotten in the march of
society. They certainly would be ? cruel and unusual." Yet I
am old enough to have seen a pillory standing in the midst of a
village, now one of the most refined towns in the State.
Contempt at the common law was likewise punished by the pillory; for with the Courts of England, the mode was measurably
one of practice; with us it is a matter of law founded on American
principles for the action of the Government on its citizens. Surely
we have passed by that mode of punishment without a statute, because it is not.nzecessar~y, and it is cruel in this age.
But I have not suffibient evidence that commitments during the
pleasure of the Court, or until further order of the Court,.would
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have been good in England. What had been deferred to the King
might not, if examined, have been deferred to the Courts. Precedents might frequently have been made by letting things pass
without examination. Much of this may be inferred from what
Mr. Justice Powys said in the case of Begina vs. Paty, 2 Lord
Raym. 1108, "If all commitments for contempts, even those 'by
this Court," (the Queen's Bench,) "s h ould come to be scanned,
they would not hold water." In' a late case of a commitment for

a contempt, the King's Bench discharged the party because the
time was not fixed in the mittimus, 5 Barnw. and Ald. Rep. 394,
Vi c King vs. James.

A commitment during the pleasure of the House of Commons was
deemed good. But the Courts held that it was not indefinite, but
that the imprisonment must terminate with the adjournmen't of the
House; and.this is strictly true as to the termination of any commitment by a parliamentary body, as decided by the SuLpreme Court
of the United States in the case of Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheat.
204. The power of the House of Commons to commit for contempt, is stated by .De Grey in the Lord Mayor's case, -to be
"legal, because necessary."

Is it necessary that the Courts in this country should have power
to commit until further order ot the Court ? I cannot find ii. I
can see no call for it. -I can see danger in it; and the law should
not make'danger, where there is no necessity. A freeman should
never, by the laws of freeme#, be placed in such dreary uncertainty of imprisonment as that when he inqui.es of the "law of
the land," it cannot tell him when it shall end
No absolute power lives in this country. It cannot exist in a
republic. See 2d section of the Bill of Rights.
Suppose the Court should adjourn, without having made any further order, the consideration of his case is cut off at once and
entirely until the next term. So he must be left without any authority of the judiciary even to meditate his case. And a person
committed for contempt cannot be bailed.
The time should be fixed as to its maximum. Then the punishment is duly weighed at once. Then, too, the. Eiecutive may see
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-whether it may be proper to interpose his extraordinary power ; a
power scarcely ever exercised in America in cases of contempt,
because of the leniency of our Courts ; and because the governors
have deemed the pardoning of contempts an interference with the
necessary power of the judiciary.
When the time is fixed, beyond which the Court will not go, then
the addition to the order, "1or until the further order of the Court,"
would keep the whole matter in charge of the Court, so that on proper terms, the party might be released before the time arrived.
So when there is a commitment for the purpose of enforcing the
payment of money, or the delivery of property, the Court should
provide in the order, that the party be discharged on giving surety
for the money in some form, when he has not got it ; and on paying the price of the property, if it shall turn out that the party
cannot deliver it ; and so of other cases, in order that nothing shall
be inflicted but of necessity. This course corresponds with the case
of Patton vs. The Commonwealth.
I know it was decided in 1810, by the Supreme Court of New
York, that a commitment until further order of the Court, was
valid. This case was reversed by the Senate, whether on this
ground or not, I do not know; nor do I regard the opinion of the
Senate, except for its argument. 4 Johns. Rep. 318, The case of
Yates; 6 Johns. Rep. 337, same case on Error. In the syllabus
made by the reporter to the case of Yates vs. Lansing, 9 Johns.
Rep. 395, it is said, that what was decided by the Supreme Court
in the first case, was affirmed in this; but this is not authorized by
what was decided in the case, and the syllabus is wrong.
The judgment of the Supreme Court in New York is certainly a
precedent that any of us, at first thought, might follow. Bui I
do not think its doctrine can be derived from our institutions, nor
do I think we can venture to transplant such from beyond the
water; we cannot even say it was the common law. I know it
would be a safe power in the hands of the enlightened and benevolent judge wlo made the order in question here; but my view of
the law compels me to decide that the commitment was not valid.
Logan and T. ..
Marshall, for the Petition.
Fry, against it.

